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Urban water conservation is typically achieved through prescriptive regulations, 
including the rationing of water for particular uses and requirements for the installation of 
particular technologies.  A significant shift has occurred in pollution control regulations toward 
market-based policies in recent decades.  We offer an analysis of the relative merits of market-
based and prescriptive approaches to water conservation, where prices have rarely been used to 
allocate scarce supplies.  The analysis emphasizes the emerging theoretical and empirical 
evidence that using prices to manage water demand is more cost-effective than implementing 
non-price conservation programs, similar to results for pollution control in earlier decades.   
Price-based approaches also have advantages in terms of monitoring and enforcement.  In terms 
of predictability and equity, neither policy instrument has an inherent advantage over the other.  
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1.  Introduction  6 
Cities, towns, and villages around the world struggle to manage water resources in the  7 
face of population increases, consumer demand for water-intensive services, and increasing costs  8 
(including environmental costs) of developing new supplies.  In this paper, we provide an  9 
economic perspective on reducing urban water demand through pricing and non-price  10 
conservation policies. We compare price and non-price approaches to water conservation along  11 
five dimensions: the ability of policies to achieve water conservation goals, cost-effectiveness,  12 
distributional equity, monitoring and enforcement, and political feasibility.  13 
The worst drought on record continues to unfold in the American southeast, affecting  14 
major cities such as Atlanta, Georgia, and Raleigh, North Carolina.  In the arid Western U.S., the  15 
Colorado River system faces the worst drought on record, lasting (thus far) from 1999 to 2008  16 
and leaving Lake Mead (the source of more than 90% of Las Vegas’s water) about half empty.  17 
Municipal water consumption comprises only about 12% of total freshwater withdrawals  18 
in the United States; and agricultural irrigation, the single largest water use, comprises just over  19 
one-third of all withdrawals (Hutson et al. 2004).  While analysis suggests that re-allocating  20 
water from agriculture to cities would be efficient in many regions, in the current legal and  21 
political setting, large-scale transfers of water rights from agriculture to cities are relatively  22 
uncommon (Brewer et al. 2007, Brown 2006, Howe 1997).  Thus, cities often must reduce water  23 
consumption during acute shortages due to drought, or in the long run due to constraints on their  24 
ability to increase supply.   25   2 
 
The efficient water price is the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) of its supply.  LRMC  26 
reflects the full economic cost of water supply – the cost of transmission, treatment and  27 
distribution; some portion of the capital cost of reservoirs and treatment systems, both those in  28 
existence and those future facilities necessitated by current patterns of use; and the opportunity  29 
cost in both use and non-use value of water for other potential purposes.  Many analysts have  30 
noted that water prices, for many urban as well as agricultural uses, lie well below LRMC (Sibly  31 
2006, Timmins 2003, Hanemann 1997), with significant welfare consequences (Renzetti 1992,  32 
Russell and Shin 1996).  In the short run, without price increases acting as a signal, water  33 
consumption proceeds during periods of scarcity at a faster-than efficient pace.  Water  34 
conservation takes place only under “moral suasion or direct regulation” (Howe 1997).  In  35 
contrast, if water prices rose as reservoir levels fell during periods of limited rainfall, consumers  36 
would respond by using less water, reducing or eliminating uses according to households’  37 
particular preferences.  In the long run, inefficient prices alter land-use patterns, industrial  38 
location decisions, and other important factors.  The sum of all these individual decisions affects  39 
the sustainability of local and regional water resources.  40 
Implementation of efficient water prices would be challenging, to say the least.  Some of  41 
the opportunity costs of urban water supply are exceedingly difficult to quantify.  What is the  42 
value of a gallon of water left instream to support endangered species habitat, for example?   43 
While economists have developed a variety of useful methods for estimating such values, the  44 
expectation that every water supplier will develop full individual measures of the LRMC of  45 
water supply is unrealistic.  If LRMC represents an ultimate water pricing goal, there are smaller,  46 
less ambitious steps toward efficiency that can be accomplished more readily.  47   3 
 
Even with inefficient prices, injecting better price signals into the processes of water use  48 
and allocation can result in important improvements.  For example, given a particular public  49 
goal, such as the conservation of a particular quantity of water or percentage of current  50 
consumption, various policies can be employed, some more costly than others.  Choosing  the  51 
least costly method of achieving some water-provision goal is characterized in economic terms  52 
as cost-effective water management.  Even if the water conservation goal is, itself, inefficient,  53 
society can benefit from the minimization of costs to achieve it.    54 
We focus on this issue of policy instrument choice for water conservation, summarizing  55 
research from the economics literature, including both our own work on this issue and that of  56 
other economists.  Given the strong theoretical cost advantages of market-based approaches to  57 
water conservation over conventional alternatives, and the emerging empirical evidence for the  58 
potential cost savings from moving to market-based approaches to conservation, the time is ripe  59 
for a discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of these policy instruments.    60 
  61 
2. Cost-effectiveness of water conservation policies  62 
  Decades of theoretical and empirical economic analysis suggest that market-based  63 
environmental policies are more cost-effective than conventional policies, often characterized as  64 
command-and-control (CAC) or prescriptive approaches.  Market-based regulations encourage  65 
behavior through market signals rather than through explicit directives regarding conservation  66 
levels or methods.  These policy instruments, if well-designed and implemented, encourage firms  67 
and households to undertake conservation efforts that are in their own interests and collectively  68 
meet policy goals.  CAC approaches, in contrast, allow little flexibility in the means of achieving  69   4 
 
goals and often require households and/or firms to undertake similar shares of a conservation  70 
burden regardless of cost.    71 
In the area of pollution control, the cost-effectiveness advantage of market-based  72 
approaches over CAC policies has been demonstrated theoretically (Pigou 1920, Crocker 1966,  73 
Dales 1968, Montgomery 1972, Baumol and Oates 1988) and empirically (Keohane 2007,  74 
Teitenberg 2006).  Perhaps the best-known application of these principles to environmental  75 
regulation is the U.S. SO2 trading program, established under Title IV of the Clean Air Act  76 
Amendments of 1990, which has produced cost savings on the order of $1 billion annually  77 
(Stavins 2003).  Dozens of other market-based policies have been applied to air and water  78 
pollution control, fisheries management, and other environmental problems in industrialized and  79 
developing countries (Kolstad and Freeman 2007, Stavins 2003, Sterner 2003, Panayotou 1998).  80 
Economists’ attention has only recently turned to examining the potential economic gains  81 
from adopting market-based approaches to water conservation, rather than CAC approaches.   82 
Whereas the gains from market-based approaches to pollution control depend critically on  83 
heterogeneity in marginal abatement costs across firms (Newell and Stavins 2003), the cost  84 
savings from market-based approaches to water conservation derive largely from heterogeneity  85 
in households’ marginal benefits from water consumption (Mansur and Olmstead 2007).  This is  86 
because current CAC approaches to water conservation are essentially rationing policies.  This  87 
makes the application similar to other cases in which rationing has been replaced with price- 88 
based allocation, such as traffic congestion on roadways (Parry and Bento 2002) and at airports  89 
(Pels and Verhof 2004).  Recent studies demonstrate how raising prices, rather than  90 
implementing non-price policies, can substantially reduce the economic cost of achieving water  91 
consumption reductions (Collinge 1994; Krause et al. 2003; Brennan et al. 2007).    92   5 
 
In order to illustrate the basic economics, we can examine one typical CAC approach to  93 
water conservation – a citywide required demand reduction achieved by uniformly restricting  94 
outdoor uses.  Figure 1 portrays two households with the same indoor demand curves, but  95 
different preferences with respect to outdoor demand. The difference in slopes of the three  96 
demand curves is associated with differences in elasticity – the percentage change in demand  97 
prompted by a one percent price increase.  (For all but one specific class of demand function,  98 
price elasticity varies along the demand curve, thus while we can speak broadly about  99 
comparisons across demand curves, there may be points on a relatively steep demand curve at  100 
which price elasticity exceeds that on some parts of a flat demand curve.)  Here we assume that  101 
indoor demand (frame C in Figure 1), the steepest curve, is inelastic, because indoor uses are less  102 
easily reduced in response to price changes, reflecting the basic needs met by indoor water use.   103 
For outdoor demand, there is a relatively elastic household (Panel A), and a somewhat less  104 
elastic household (Panel B). The more elastic household is more likely to reduce outdoor demand  105 
in response to a price increase – perhaps because it has weaker preferences for outdoor  106 
consumption (e.g., in the short run, it would rather allow the lawn to turn brown than pay a  107 
higher water bill to keep it green).    108 
Unregulated, with price set atP , both households consume QC units of water indoors, the  109 
less elastic household consumes 
unreg
B Q outdoors, and the more elastic household consumes 
unreg
A Q   110 
outdoors.  Outdoor reduction mandated under a CAC approach (which leaves indoor use  111 
unchanged, and reduces outdoor uses to 
reg
B Q and 
reg
A Q ) creates a “shadow price” for outdoor  112 
consumption (λ) that is higher under the current marginal price (P ) for household B than for  113 
household A, because household B is willing to pay more for an additional unit of water than  114 
household A.  If instead the water supplier charges price P*, that achieves the same aggregate  115   6 
 
level of water conservation as the prescriptive approach, consumers would realize all potential  116 
gains from substitution within and across households, erasing the shaded deadweight loss (DWL)  117 
triangles.  Consumption moves to 
*
C Q  indoors for both types of households, and to 
*
A Q  and 
*
B Q   118 
outdoors.  The savings from the market-based approach are driven by two factors: (1) the ability  119 
of households facing higher prices rather than quantity restrictions to decide which uses to  120 
reduce according to their own preferences; and (2) allowing heterogeneous responses to the  121 
regulation across households, resulting in substitution of scarce water from those households  122 
who value it less, to those who value it more.  123 
How large are the losses from non-price demand management approaches when  124 
examined empirically?  We know of only three cases in which the welfare losses from  125 
prescriptive water conservation policies have been estimated.  Timmins (2003) compared a  126 
mandatory low-flow appliance regulation with a modest water price increase, using aggregate  127 
consumption data from 13 groundwater-dependent California cities.  Under all but the least  128 
realistic of assumptions, he found prices to be more cost-effective than technology standards in  129 
reducing groundwater aquifer lift-height in the long run.  130 
Another study of 11 urban areas in the United States and Canada compared residential  131 
outdoor watering restrictions with drought pricing (Mansur and Olmstead 2007).  For the same  132 
level of aggregate demand reduction as implied by a two-day-per-week outdoor watering  133 
restriction, the establishment of a market-clearing drought price in these cities would result in  134 
welfare gains of approximately $81 per household per summer drought.  This represents about  135 
one-quarter of the average household’s total annual water bill in the study.    136 
Using a different approach, Brennan et al. (2007) constructed a household production  137 
model to estimate the welfare cost of urban outdoor water restrictions in Perth, Australia, and  138   7 
 
arrived at similar conclusions.  The household welfare costs of a two-day-per-week sprinkling  139 
restriction are just under $100 per household per season, and the costs of a complete outdoor  140 
watering ban range from $347-$870 per household per season.  141 
Based on both economic theory and empirical estimates, the inescapable conclusion is  142 
that using price increases to reduce demand, allowing households, industrial facilities, and other  143 
consumers to adjust their end-uses of water is more cost-effective than implementing non-price  144 
demand management programs.    145 
  146 
3.  Predictability in Achieving Water Conservation Goals  147 
3.1    Effects of Price on Water Demand  148 
If policymakers are to use prices to manage demand, the key variable of interest is the  149 
price elasticity of water demand.  Because an increase in the price of water leads consumers to  150 
demand less of it, all else equal, price elasticity is a negative number.  (Elasticity figures may  151 
also be reported in absolute value, and the negative sign is then implicit.  We use the more  152 
conventional negative sign in this paper.)  An important benchmark in elasticity is –1.0; this  153 
figure divides demand curves into the categories of elastic and inelastic.    154 
There is a critical distinction between “inelastic demand” and demand which is  155 
“unresponsive to price”.   If demand is truly unresponsive to price, price elasticity is equal to  156 
zero, and the demand curve is a vertical line – the same quantity of water will be demanded at  157 
any price.  This may be true in theory for a subsistence quantity of drinking water, but it has not  158 
been observed for water demand more broadly in fifty years of empirical economic analysis.  159 
  That said, water demand in the residential sector is sensitive to price, but demand is  160 
inelastic at current prices.  In a meta-analysis of 124 estimates generated between 1963 and  161   8 
 
1993, accounting for the precision of estimates, Espey et al. (1997) obtained an average price  162 
elasticity of –0.51, a short-run median estimate of –0.38, and a long-run median estimate of – 163 
0.64.  Likewise, Dalhuisen et al. (2003) obtained a mean price elasticity of -0.41 in a meta- 164 
analysis of almost 300 price elasticity studies, 1963-1998. And a recent, comprehensive study of  165 
water demand in eleven urban areas in the United States and Canada found that the price  166 
elasticity of water demand was approximately –0.33 (Olmstead et al. 2007).  The price elasticity  167 
of residential demand varies substantially across place and time, but on average, in the United  168 
States, a 10% increase in the marginal price of water in the urban residential sector can be  169 
expected to diminish demand by about three to four percent in the short run.  This is similar to  170 
empirical estimates of the price elasticity of residential energy demand (Bohi and Zimmerman  171 
1984, Bernstein and Griffin 2005).    172 
  There are some important caveats worth mentioning.  First, elasticities vary along a  173 
demand curve, and any estimate represents an elasticity at a specific price, in particular, actual  174 
(current) prices.  Were prices to approach the efficient levels discussed earlier, water demand  175 
would likely be much more sensitive to price increases.    176 
Second, consumers are relatively more sensitive to water prices in the long run than they  177 
are in the short run, because over longer time periods, capital investments are not fixed.  For  178 
example, households might change appliance stocks, retrofit water-using fixtures, or alter  179 
landscaping from lawns to drought-tolerant plants; firms can be expected to change water- 180 
consuming technologies, increase recycling, or relocate to areas in which water is more plentiful.   181 
In the long run, a 10% price increase can be expected to decrease demand by about six percent.  182 
Third, price elasticities vary with many other factors.  In the residential sector, high- 183 
income households tend to be much less sensitive to water price increases than low-income  184   9 
 
households.  Also, price elasticity may increase by 30 percent or more when price information is  185 
posted on water bills (Gaudin 2006).  And price elasticity may be higher under increasing-block  186 
prices (in which the marginal volumetric water price increases with consumption) than under  187 
uniform volumetric prices (Olmstead et al. 2007).  Price elasticities must be interpreted in the  188 
context in which they have been derived.    189 
3.2   Effects of Non-price Conservation Programs on Water Demand  190 
Historically, water suppliers have relied on non-price conservation programs to induce  191 
demand reductions during shortages.  We consider the effects of such non-price programs in  192 
three categories: (1) required or voluntary adoption of water-conserving technologies; (2)  193 
mandatory water use restrictions; and (3) mixed non-price conservation programs.  194 
3.2.1  Required or Voluntary Adoption of Water-Conserving Technologies  195 
  Many urban water utilities have experimented with required or voluntary adoption of  196 
low-flow technologies. (Since the 1992 Energy Policy Act, U.S. law has required the installation  197 
of low-flow toilets and showerheads in all new residential construction, but some cities have also  198 
mandated or encouraged retrofitting.)  When water savings from these programs have been  199 
estimated, they have often been smaller than expected, due to behavioral changes that partially  200 
offset the benefit of greater technical efficiency.  For example, households with low-flow  201 
showerheads may take longer showers than they would without these fixtures (Mayer et al.  202 
1998).  The necessity of the “double flush” was a notorious difficulty with early models of low- 203 
flow toilets. In a recent demonstration of similar compensating behavior, randomly-selected  204 
households had their top-loading clotheswashers replaced with more water efficient, front- 205 
loading washers.  In this field trial, the average front-loading household increased clothes- 206   10 
 
washing by 5.6 percent, perhaps due to the cost savings associated with the appliances’ increased  207 
efficiency (Davis 2006).  208 
Several engineering studies have observed a small number of households in a single  209 
region to estimate the water savings associated with low-flow fixtures.  But most of these studies  210 
used intrusive data collection mechanisms, attaching equipment to faucets and other fixtures in  211 
homes (Brown and Caldwell 1984).  Study participants were aware they were being monitored as  212 
they used water, which may have led to confounding behavioral changes.   213 
One comprehensive study that was not characterized by this monitoring problem  214 
indicates that households fully constructed or retrofitted with low-flow toilets used about 20  215 
percent less water than households with no low-flow toilets.  The equivalent savings reported for  216 
low-flow showerheads was 9 percent (Mayer et al. 1998).  Careful studies of low-flow  217 
showerhead retrofit programs in the East Bay Municipal Utility District, California, and Tampa,  218 
Florida estimate water savings of 1.7 and 3.6 gallons per capita per day (gpcpd), respectively  219 
(Aher  et al. 1991; Anderson et al. 1993).  In contrast, showerhead replacement had no  220 
statistically significant effect in Boulder, Colorado (Aquacraft 1996).  Savings reported for low- 221 
flow toilet installation and rebate programs range from 6.1 gpcpd in Tampa, Florida to 10.6  222 
gpcpd in Seattle, Washington (U.S. General Accounting Office 2000).  Renwick and Green  223 
(2000) estimate no significant effect of ultra low-flush toilet rebates in Santa Barbara, California.   224 
It is not surprising that studies of the water savings induced by such policies vary widely,  225 
from zero to significant water savings – the scope and nature of policies vary widely, as well.   226 
More important than the raw water savings induced by these programs, however, is the cost per  227 
gallon saved, in comparison with alternative policies.  The costs of toilet retrofit policies  228 
implemented in U.S. cities range from less than $100,000 to replace 1,226 toilets in Phoenix,  229   11 
 
Arizona to $290 million for 1.3 million toilets in New York City (U.S. General Accounting  230 
Office 2000).  These can be expensive programs, but in most cases no analysis is done to  231 
estimate the magnitude of price increases that would have induced demand reductions equivalent  232 
to those observed with technology standards.  Only with such information can price and non- 233 
price demand management programs be compared as policy options on the basis of cost.    234 
3.2.2  Mandatory Water-Use Restrictions  235 
  Non-price management tools also include utility implementation of mandatory water use  236 
restrictions, much like the traditional command-and-control approach to pollution regulation.  237 
These include restrictions on the total quantity of water that can be used, as well as restrictions  238 
on particular water uses, usually outdoors, such as lawn-watering and car-washing.  Empirical  239 
evidence regarding the effects of these programs is mixed.  Summer 1996 water consumption  240 
restrictions in Corpus Christi, Texas, including prohibitions on landscape irrigation and car- 241 
washing, did not prompt statistically significant water savings in the residential sector (Schultz et  242 
al. 1997).  However, a longer-term program in Pasadena, California resulted in aggregate water  243 
savings (Kiefer et al. 1993), as did a program of mandatory water use restrictions in Santa  244 
Barbara, California (Renwick and Green 2000).  245 
3.2.3  Mixed Non-Price Conservation Programs  246 
  Water utilities often implement a variety of non-price conservation programs  247 
simultaneously, making it difficult to determine the effects of individual policies.  One analysis  248 
of the effect of conservation programs on aggregate water district consumption in California  249 
found small but significant reductions in total water use attributable to landscape education  250 
programs and watering restrictions, but no effect due to non-landscape conservation education  251 
programs, low-flow fixture distribution, or the presentation of drought and conservation  252   12 
 
information on customer bills (Corral 1997).  Another study of southern California cities found  253 
that the number of conservation programs in place in a city had a small negative impact on total  254 
residential water demand (Michelsen et al. 1998).  An aggregate demand study in California  255 
found that public information campaigns, retrofit subsidies, water rationing, and water use  256 
restrictions had negative and statistically significant impacts on average monthly residential  257 
water use, and the more stringent policies had stronger effects than voluntary policies and  258 
education programs (Renwick and Green 2000).  259 
3.2.4.  Summing up the predictability comparison  260 
Predictability of the effects of a water conservation policy may be of considerable  261 
importance to water suppliers, although in most cases the objective of water conservation  262 
policies is water savings, without any specific target in mind.  In this case, an estimate of the  263 
reduction expected from policy implementation is necessary, but precision is less important.    264 
If certainty is required, economic theory would suggest that the quantity restrictions  265 
typical of traditional, prescriptive approaches to water demand management would be preferred  266 
to price increases, particularly if water suppliers could be sure of near-total compliance, or at  267 
least be able to adjust their water savings target upward to account for a reliable estimate of the  268 
noncompliance rate (Weitzman 1973).  But suppliers generally cannot rely on substantial  269 
compliance with quantity-based restrictions.  In a comprehensive study of drought management  270 
policies among 85 urban water utilities during a prolonged drought in Southern California,  271 
analysts reported that 40 agencies adopted mandatory quantity restrictions, but also found that  272 
more than half of the customers violated the restrictions (Dixon et al. 1996).  Such non-binding  273 
quantity constraints are common, but how are utilities to predict the water savings achievable  274 
through quantity restrictions when less than half of consumers typically comply?  In the same  275   13 
 
study, about three-quarters of participating urban water agencies implemented type-of-use  276 
restrictions (most of them mandatory).  Few penalties were reported, and enforcement was weak,  277 
again raising questions regarding compliance.  With such low rates of compliance with  278 
traditional quantity-based regulations, neither price nor non-price demand management programs  279 
have an advantage in terms of predicting water demand reductions.    280 
  281 
4.  Equity and Distributional Considerations  282 
The main distributional concern with a market-based approach to urban water  283 
management arises from the central feature of a market – allocation of a scarce good by  284 
willingness to pay (WTP).  Under some conditions, WTP may be considered an unjust allocation  285 
criterion.  Think, for example, about the negative reaction to selling food and water to the highest  286 
bidder in the aftermath of a natural disaster.  This sense that there are some goods and services  287 
that should not be distributed by markets in particular contexts is behind the practice of rationing  288 
during wartime.  A portion of water in residential consumption is used for basic needs, such as  289 
drinking and bathing.  “Lifeline” rates and other accommodations ensuring that water bills are  290 
not unduly burdensome for low-income households are common.  Thus, policymakers  291 
considering market-based approaches to water management must be concerned about equity in  292 
policy design.  293 
What does the empirical evidence tell us about the equity implications of water pricing as  294 
a conservation tool?  Agthe and Billings (1987) found that low-income households exhibited a  295 
larger demand response to price increases in Tucson, Arizona, but the study did not compare the  296 
distributional effects of price and non-price approaches.  Renwick and Archibald (1998) found  297 
that low-income households in two Southern California communities were more price-responsive  298   14 
 
than high-income households, reflecting water expenditures’ larger share of the household  299 
budget.  Thus, if water demand management occurs solely through price increases, low-income  300 
households will contribute a greater fraction of the cities’ aggregate water savings than high- 301 
income households.  This is not surprising to economists – price elasticity tends to decline with  302 
the fraction of household income spent on a particular good.    303 
Importantly, the distributional implications of non-price policies vary by type.  For  304 
example, requiring particular landscape irrigation technologies results in demand reduction  305 
mainly among higher-income households (Renwick and Archibald 1998).    306 
  Mansur and Olmstead (2007) examined the distributional impacts of various demand  307 
management policies, and found that raising prices to reduce consumption would cause a greater  308 
consumption reduction for low-income than for high-income households.  (If we return to Figure  309 
1 and assume that households of type A are low-income and type B are high-income, we can see  310 
why this happens.)  311 
The fact that price-based approaches are regressive in water consumption does not mean  312 
they are necessarily regressive in cost. Likewise, the fact that non-price programs are progressive  313 
in water consumption does not mean they are progressive in cost.  The impact of non-price  314 
programs on distributional equity depends largely on how a non-price program is financed.  And  315 
progressive price-based approaches to water demand management can be designed by returning  316 
utility profits (from higher prices) in the form of rebates.  In the case of residential water users,  317 
this could occur through the utility billing process.  318 
Drought pricing, like LRMC pricing, would cause utilities to earn substantial short-run  319 
profits (Mansur and Olmstead 2007). These profits would have to be returned to consumers in  320 
some form, as regulated utilities usually are required to earn zero or very low profits.  Profits  321   15 
 
could be re-allocated based upon income, in order to achieve equity goals.  Any rebate scheme  322 
that is not tied to current consumption can retain the strong economic-incentive benefits of  323 
drought pricing, without imposing excessive burdens on low-income households, relative to  324 
traditional approaches.  325 
  326 
5.  Monitoring and Enforcement  327 
Price-based approaches to water demand management hold a substantial advantage over  328 
non-price approaches in regard to administrative costs for monitoring and enforcement.  Non- 329 
price demand management policies require that water suppliers monitor and enforce restrictions  330 
on particular fixtures, appliances, and other technologies that customers use indoors and out, the  331 
particular days of the week or times of day that customers use water for specific purposes, and in  332 
some cases, the quantity used for each purpose.    333 
The great difficulty in monitoring and enforcing these types of command-and-control  334 
approaches is one reason for the prevalence of outdoor watering restrictions – outdoor uses are  335 
usually visible, and it is relatively easy to cruise residential streets searching for violators.    336 
Overall, monitoring and enforcement problems explain the low rates of compliance with many  337 
non-price demand management programs.   Where low-flow fixtures are encouraged or required,  338 
they are often replaced with their higher-flow alternatives if consumers are dissatisfied with  339 
performance.  340 
In contrast, non-compliance in the case of pricing requires that households consume  341 
water “off meter,” since water consumption is metered and billed volumetrically in most U.S.  342 
cities.  Of course, higher prices generate incentives not only for conservation, but also for  343 
avoidance.  However, at prevailing prices and even with substantial price increases, the  344   16 
 
monitoring and enforcement requirements of price changes are likely to be far less significant  345 
than those of a comparable non-price approach.    346 
  347 
6. Political  Considerations  348 
Water demand management through non-price techniques is the overwhelmingly  349 
dominant paradigm in cities around the world.  Raising prices, particularly for what people  350 
perceive to be a “public service” (though water is supplied by both public and private entities),  351 
can be politically difficult.  After a two-year drought in the late 1970s, the city of Tucson,  352 
Arizona was the first U.S. city to adopt marginal-cost water prices, which involved a substantial  353 
price increase.  One year later, the entire Tucson city council was voted out of office due to the  354 
water rate increase (Hall 2000).  Just as few elected officials relish the prospect of raising taxes,  355 
few want to increase water rates.  356 
Ironically, non-price programs are more expensive to society than water price increases,  357 
once the real costs of programs and associated welfare losses are considered.  A parallel can be  358 
drawn in this case to market-based approaches to environmental pollution control, including  359 
taxes and tradable permit systems.  Cost-effectiveness has only recently been accepted as an  360 
important criterion for the selection of policies to control pollution (Keohane et al. 1998).    361 
Despite empirical evidence regarding their higher costs, political constituencies that prefer non- 362 
price approaches have succeeded in preventing management through prices.  Some of this  363 
resistance to using prices may be due to misinformation, since most policymakers and water  364 
customers are not aware of the cost-effectiveness advantage of the price-based approach.  For  365 
example, a common misconception in this regard is that price elasticity is “too low to make a  366 
difference”.  367   17 
 
Non-price demand management techniques can create political liabilities in the form of  368 
water utility budget deficits.  Non-price conservation programs are costly.  In addition, if these  369 
policies actually reduce demand, water utility revenues decline.  During prolonged droughts,  370 
these combined effects can result in the necessity for substantial price increases following  371 
“successful” non-price conservation programs, simply to prevent water utilities from  372 
unsustainable financial losses.  This occurred in 1991 in southern California.  During a prolonged  373 
drought, Los Angeles water consumers responded to the Department of Water and Power’s  374 
request for voluntary water use reductions.  Total use and total revenues fell by more than 20  375 
percent.  As a result, the Department requested a rate increase to cover its growing losses (Hall  376 
2000).  In contrast, given urban price elasticities common in the United States, price increases  377 
will increase water suppliers’ total revenues.  The extra per-unit revenues from a price increase  378 
outweighs lost revenue from the decreased demand.  379 
The costs of inefficient water pricing and the relative cost advantages of price over non- 380 
price water demand management programs are clear.  But like other subsidies, low water prices  381 
(on a day-to-day basis, as well as during periods of drought) are popular and politically difficult  382 
to change.  Some communities may be willing to continue to bear excessive costs from  383 
inefficient water pricing, in exchange for the political popularity of low prices.  In other cases,  384 
rate-setting officials may be constrained by law, unable to increase water prices by a percentage  385 
that exceeds some statutory maximum.  In these cases, the tradeoffs involved should be  386 
measured and made explicit to water customers.  387 
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7.   Conclusions  389 
  Using prices to manage water demand is more cost-effective than implementing non- 390 
price conservation programs.  The gains from using prices as an incentive for conservation come  391 
from allowing households to respond to increased water prices in the manner of their choice,  392 
rather than by installing a particular technology or reducing particular uses, as prescribed by non- 393 
price approaches. Price-based approaches also have important advantages in terms of monitoring  394 
and enforcement.    395 
In terms of predictability, neither policy instrument has an inherent advantage over the  396 
other. Likewise, neither policy instrument has a natural advantage in terms of equity.  Under  397 
price-based approaches, low-income households are likely to contribute a greater share of a  398 
city’s aggregate water consumption reduction than they do under certain types of non-price  399 
demand management policies.  But progressive price-based approaches to water demand  400 
management can be developed by returning some utility profits due to higher prices in the form  401 
of consumer rebates.  Such rebates will not significantly dampen the effects of price increases on  402 
water demand, as long as rebates are not tied to current water consumption.    403 
Raising water prices (like the elimination of any subsidy) is politically difficult, but there  404 
may be political capital to be earned by elected officials who can demonstrate the cost- 405 
effectiveness advantages of the price-based approach.  At a minimum, communities choosing  406 
politically popular low water prices over cost-effectiveness should quantify this tradeoff and  407 
make it explicit.  Where water rate-setting officials are constrained by law from raising water  408 
prices, during droughts or in general, a discussion of the real costs of these constraints would be  409 
useful.  410   19 
 
We are reminded of the debate, beginning in the late 1980s, over market-based  411 
approaches to pollution control.  While some opponents of environmental taxes and tradable  412 
permit systems still resist these approaches, policymakers have succeeded in implementing them  413 
in many cases, achieving impressive pollution reductions at great cost savings over more  414 
prescriptive approaches. A similar shift in the area of water conservation, where the principles  415 
are essentially the same, is long overdue.  416 
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